











AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF




Thesis Co-Advisors: Kenneth J. Euske
0. Douglas Moses




StCo"''''' CiASS fiCATiON OP ThiS pace
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
la REPORT SECuRiTY CuASSif iCATiON
UNCLASSIFIED
lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2d StCL.«'Tr CiASSifiCATiON AuTHO«iTy
2b OEC^ASS'f iCAT,ON ' DOWNGRADING SChEDULE
3 DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY Of REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited
a PERfOflN^ NG ORGANISATION REPORT NuV18ER(S) S MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NuM8ER(S)





7a NAME Of MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
(x. ADDRESS Cry Stiff *nd iiPCodt)
Monterey, California 93943-5000
7b ADDRESS (Cry $f*f*. ind IIP Code)
Monterey, California 93943-5000




9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDE N Tif iCA flON NUMBER









^ '.£ i.nc/od» Se(L/'/fy CliUifictuor)





3d ' ME COVERED
CBOM TO




ft Si^^^.t VENTARr NOTATiQN
COSAT- COOES
tiD GBOoP SwB GROUP
18 SuBjECT ''ERMS iCoritirnjt on revtrie if ntceinry tnd identify by block numt3*r)
Mergers; Acquisitions; Organizational Slack
9 ^SS' RAC (Continue On re*erte if neceiHry ind identify by block number)
This thesis analyzes the effects of corporate mergers on organizational
slack. It is hypothesized that organizational slack will be reduced in the
acquiring firms following the merger. Further, it is hypothesized that the
type of merger will affect the resultant change in slack. A multi-
dimensional financial model is used to measure change in slack between
pre- and post-merger time frames for 50 mergers that occurred in 1977 and
1978. Similar measures are calculated for a control group of 43 nonmerging
firms. It is found that the merged firms undergo significantly greater
reductions in slack than their nonmerging counterparts. Among the merged
firms, horizontal mergers show the largest decrease in slack, followed by
vertical mergers, and finally conglomerates.
-£
Dr= aj'GNAvAiLABiliTv Of ABSTRACT
NC.ASS'f ed^jnl'Mited D same AS rpt D DTiC l^SERS
21 abstract security CLASSifiCATiON
Unclassified
lit '.AVE Of RESPONSIBLE NO^ViOUAL
Prof. Kenneth J. Euske
22b TE LE PHONE /(o<:/w<^» Area Cod«) 22c OffiCt V^VBOl
(408 646-2860 Code 54Ee
DO FORM 1473,84MAR 83 APR ed't'on T'ay te used u^iii e«hau»ted
All other edit>or>t are obsolete
SECURITY CLASSlfiCATlQN Of i'hiS PACE
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
An Empirical Analysis of the Influence of
Corporate Mergers on Organizational Slack
by
David L. Hingtgen
Lieutenant, Unitfed States Navy
B.A. , University of Minnesota, 1975
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





This thesis analyzes the effects of corporate mergers on
organizational slack. It is hypothesized that organization-
al slack will be reduced in the acquiring firms following
the merger. Further, it is hypothesized that the type of
merger will affect the resultant change in slack. A multi-
dimensional financial model is used to measure change in
slack between pre- and post-merger time frames for 50
mergers that occurred in 1977 and 1978. Similar measures
are calculated for a control group of 43 nonmerging firms.
It is found that the merged firms undergo significantly
greater reductions in slack than their nonmerging
counterparts. Among the merged firms, horizontal mergers
show the largest decrease in slack, followed by vertical
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Peak merger waves have historically raised the same
questions, namely, what effects will the extensive merger
activity have on the economy and society in general? The
multitude of concerns include the threat of increasingly
concentrated markets and the ensuing monopolies, the
overwhelming political power obtained through megamergers,
reduced employment, artificially high prices, and a lack of
response to consumer demands.
In addition to public considerations, mergers impact
significantly on several other groups, each with their own
concerns and fears. Management within both the acquired and
acquiring firms hope the merger will result in more
efficient operations and greater profitability; conversely,
they fear the potential job loss and organizational
upheavals that may result. Shareholders of the acquiring
firms hope to realize gains through their installation of
perceived managerial superiority. Shareholders of the
acquired firms look for increased stock prices and a chance
to capitalize on the buyer's vast resources. Finally, the
owners and top-level executives see the merger as an
opportunity to gain prestige and power, reduce risk, and
take on even more challenging and exciting enterprises.
(Benston, 1980)
Conflicts between the diverse factions involved in the
merger game have resulted in government intervention in the
form of antitrust legislation and more extensive industry
scrutiny by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
.
The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890), Clayton Act (1914), and
Cellar-Kefauver Act (1950) are major constraints on merger
activity; however, whether or not they are sufficient enough
to protect the American public is a question for continued
debate. One faction argues that there is little or no
apparent advantage to mergers, either in terms of
profitability or improved output and efficiency;
consequently, they advocate banning all mergers (Mueller,
1980) . Merger supporters counter that well-planned
acquisitions result in economies of scale, synergistic
effects, risk reduction, and production efficiencies, all of
which would not be gained through ordinary expansion (Fisher
& Lande, 1983)
.
In actuality, there has been little empirical support
for the advantages of mergers. On the contrary, most
studies have shown no improvement in post-merger
profitability and some have even shown declines in overall
performance (Steiner, 1975; Mueller, 1980). Although the
research attempting to study merger effects is quite
considerable (Short, 1967; Steiner, 1975; Davidson, 1985),
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the concept of organizational slack has not been applied as
a measure of merger performance. This measure of total
operational capabilities may serve as an accurate indicator
of merger effectiveness in that it is indicative of a firm's
total resource utilization. The study of slack allows one
to investigate changes in business activity that occur as a
result of managerial, organizational, and economic
considerations. The purpose of this study is to investigate
the effects of merger activity on organizational slack.
This chapter is a general overview of the thesis.
First, the objectives of the study and the research
questions are discussed. Next, a brief explanation of
organizational slack and the financial measure of slack
proposed by Bourgeois and Singh are presented along with a
summary of the research findings. Finally, a summary of
each chapter is presented.
B. OBJECTIVES
This thesis looks at corporate mergers and acquisitions
in terms of resource utilization. The study investigates
merger activity on the basis of increased efficiencies
within the merged firms. It is assumed that a decrease in
organizational slack is associated with increased
efficiency. Several concepts and definitions of
organizational slack are discussed after which an empirical
financial model is presented as a means to measure slack
levels. Changes in slack indicated by this model are then
used to investigate whether or not merger behavior is
related to the amount of slack resources in the firms
involved. If improvements in slack levels can be shown
after the mergers take place, then an argument could be made
to defend the consolidations on economic grounds.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question posed by this thesis is:
Does a relationship exist between corporate merger activity
and the amount of organizational slack maintained in the
acquiring and acquired firms? The central issue addressed
is whether or not merger activity alters the amount of slack
resources in the merged organizations. Variables such as
the type of merger, industry classification, and firm size
are analyzed in terms of the primary research question.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
Since first introduced by March and Simon in 1958, the
concept of organizational slack has undergone a variety of
empirical applications. Several theories of slack are
discussed within the thesis in order to familiarize the
reader with the research in this area. Although the
conceptualizations of slack are somewhat diverse, most
researchers agree that slack consists of an excess of
uncommitted organizational resources that result from
performance above some expected level. Teece (1982) first
suggested an explicit relationship between mergers and
10
organizational slack by stating that external growth may be
efficiency-driven as a means to better utilize slack
resources. He proposed that mergers should minimize the
slack in the firms involved by more effectively channeling
resources of the acquiring firm and providing better
managerial control over the acquired firm.
The idea that slack levels may be affected by mergers is
central to this study. Specifically, the Bourgeois and
Singh (1983) financial model is used to measure
organizational slack and to test the hypothesis that slack
levels are reduced through mergers. This model looks at
three components of slack—available, recoverable, and
potential—and distinguishes between them on the basis of
their ease of recovery. Financial data are used to
calculate the slack measures, which are then summed to give
total slack. The measures obtained are used to determine
the change in slack from before the merger to after its
completion.
A sample of mergers occurring during 1977 and 1978 is
compared with a control group of nonmerging firms. The
financial data for the sample firms are gathered from
Moody's Industrial Manuals and annual 10-K reports.
Measures of slack are then calculated for each firm over the
period from four years prior to the merger to four years
after. Changes in slack levels are determined by comparing
pre-merger and post-merger quantities. These changes are
11
combined according to type of merger, industry group, and
firm size in order to detect any trends.
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Changes in the subcategories of available, recoverable,
and potential slack were calculated as well as the total
change. Group means were determined on the basis of
industry, firm size, and type of merger. The results
generally support the hypothesis that slack decreases as a
consequence of merger activity and that the amount of slack
reduction is a function of merger type. The comparisons of
merger type show the greatest slack reductions among the
horizontal mergers, followed by vertical mergers, and
finally conglomerates. In each case, the reductions are
greater than for the nonmerging firms. T-tests showed
significant differences between the total merging and
nonmerging categories, while tests between merger types were
not statistically significant.
Examining the change in slack levels for each industry
group did not show significant differences from the total
merger results. Firm size did not prove to be a significant
variable in determining slack changes, possibly because all
of the firms were among the largest in their respective
industries and the size distinction was arbitrary. Although
the means generally followed the directions hypothesized,
the analyses of variance showed low levels of significance
in all but the merging versus nonmerging comparisons. It is
12
suggested that the somewhat inconclusive results could stem
from an inadequate model, limitations in experimental
design, or the lack of an all-inclusive relationship between
slack and mergers.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II of this thesis reviews mergers and
acquisitions in general. A discussion of the history of
U.S. merger activity covers the significant trends and
cycles from 1870 to the present. Next, the motives and
effects of mergers are presented in terms of their economic,
managerial, and social impact.
Chapter III is a comprehensive review of the literature
dealing with organizational slack. The concept is first
examined in light of empirical studies, after which a more
concise definition is offered. Next, a relationship between
slack and merger activity is suggested. Finally, various
approaches to developing an operational measure of slack are
presented.
Chapters IV and V provide an account of the analysis
strategy used in this study. Chapter IV first presents the
empirical hypothesis posed by the thesis. Next, the
research design and data collection procedures are outlined.
The specific operational measure of slack used to
investigate the hypothesis is then given. Chapter V
consists of an initial statistical analysis followed by a
detailed interpretation of the results.
13
Chapter VI consists primarily of a summary of the
findings and concluding remarks. The chapter closes with a
brief discussion of areas for future research.
14
II. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with a definition of corporate
mergers and acquisitions and a brief description of the
types of mergers. The discussion then turns to the origins
of growth via merger, cycles and trends in merger activity,
the various reasons for merger, and antitrust legislation.
A merger may be defined as a combination of two or more
companies in which the resulting firm maintains the identity
of the acquiring company; both common management and common
ownership are the offshoots (Block & Hirt, 1984) . In an
acquisition, one company purchases the controlling interest
in another, usually through a stock purchase, and then
operates the acquired firm as a separate subsidiary or
division (Short, 1967) . Throughout the literature, and thus
throughout this paper, the two terms are used
interchangeably
.
Three general classifications of mergers can be
distinguished: horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate.
Horizontal mergers take place when two or more businesses in
identical industries combine. In a vertical merger, the
acquired company is either a supplier of raw materials or
parts, or a purchaser of the output (Mueller, 1980). The
definition of conglomerate mergers is a bit more vague
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(Mueller, 1980) . They are sometimes defined as being those
mergers that are neither horizontal nor vertical. More
specifically, conglomerate mergers are business combinations
of unrelated, diverse enterprises and are therefore not
generally considered to have as drastic an impact on
competition in a particular market. Conglomerate mergers
may be further subdivided into product extensions, market
extensions, or pure conglomerates depending on their
underlying motivation and effects within the industry
(Steiner, 1975) . These distinctions will be discussed at
length later in the chapter.
B. ORIGINS OF MERGER ACTIVITY: 1870-1895
Big business was somewhat slow to evolve in the early
years of the United States. Although a booming domestic
market encouraged manufacturing and agricultural
combinations to achieve economies of scale and better
marketing, firms were hesitant to engage in rapid expansion.
The general public feared growth and regarded any expansion
as a potential monopoly contrary to the public's welfare
(Cochran, 1977)
.
By the early 1870 's, largely as a result of the
nationwide railroad and communications expansion, more and
more manufacturing concerns came to realize that growth was
vital. The railroads broke the previous transportation
barriers and allowed widespread marketing while the
telegraph and later, the telephone, allowed centralized
16
supervision of a number of widely scattered operations. As
new technology increased rates of production, firms were
unable to market and distribute goods as rapidly as they
were produced. Somehow they had to integrate operations so
the separate functions of marketing, purchasing, and
production could all be handled under one roof. (Cochran,
1977)
Merger growth in all the major industries of the period
followed the same general trend. Mergers initially began as
trade associations or cartels consisting of many small
businesses. Next, these consolidated into a single
enterprise as a trust or holding company. After the legal
entity was formed, centralized administration evolved as a
fundamental control mechanism. Finally, the business
integrated the production and distribution processes into
one. (Chandler, 1977)
During the 1870s many trade associations were formed in
the mechanical industries of making lumber, furniture,
leather goods, and shoes; the refining and chemical
industries; and the metal fabricating enterprises. The
primary purpose of these associations was to control prices
and production (Becker, 1971) . In 1874 the Pennsylvania,
Erie, and New York Central Railroads organized a formal
cartel to better control rates and cooperatively oppose
outside competition. However, industry and railroad
associations both found such combinations difficult to
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organize and maintain. Prices were often secretly cut by
individual members, decisions could not be made regarding
the internal management of individual firms, and no legal
enforcement procedures controlled the entities. Because of
the numerous complexities and disputes that consequently
arose, many of the trade associations eventually broke up.
(Chandler, 1977)
The trusts that evolved out of the surviving trade
associations and cartels were systems whereby companies
turned their stock over to a board of trustees who were
authorized to act as a management board with the power to
make all the operations and investment decisions for the
participating companies (Hidy & Hidy, 1955) . Major trusts
in petroleum, cottonseed oil, sugar, whiskey, and lead
processing grew rapidly and controlled their respective
industries for several years, even after the constraints of
the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act (Chandler, 1977)
.
The first prominent merger in the United States came in
the oil industry. In 1882 John D. Rockefeller created the
Standard Oil Trust by persuading the stockholders of some
forty oil companies to exchange their stock for the new
Standard Oil certificates. The purpose of the trust was to
increase profits first through concentration and
centralization of production and control, and eventually by
vertical expansion into marketing and drilling. By 1890
Standard Oil had become a completely integrated business
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(Williamson & Daum, 1959) . The success at Standard Oil soon
brought similar trusts by major competitors, particularly
the Pure Oil Company who was able to capitalize on the early
structural advances of Standard and new pipeline technology
to effectively compete in the marketplace (Chandler, 1977) .
Outside of the oil industry other trusts were proving to
be powerful competitive forces. Between 1884 and 1889 the
American Cotton Oil Trust had consolidated production into
seven refineries and established an extensive marketing and
purchasing network that controlled 50 cotton gins and 52
cotton oil mills (Chandler, 1977) . When William Thompson
left Standard Oil to join the National Lead Trust in 1889,
he took with him Standard's new procedures and installed new
production consolidation methods, soon followed by
consolidated purchasing, smelting, and marketing (Chandler,
1977) . These innovations allowed National Lead to dominate
the industry for decades. The American Cereal Company was
formed in 1888 in an attempt to control the breakfast food
market; today, as the Quaker Oats Company, it is still an
industry leader.
Growth in these businesses shows the major trends of the
period. In each case the resultant merger required a
rebuilding as well as a reorganization of facilities.
Internal financing was relied upon less; instead, firms had
to look to capital markets for funds in the form of
preferred or common stock. The already expanding ownership
19
of these large businesses was further extended by these new
methods of financing.
The 1890s brought a surge of merger activity, primarily
because of the restraints placed by the Sherman Antitrust
Act. As a result of the outcry against trade associations
and trusts, many firms incorporated themselves as holding
companies. The Sherman Act did not specifically condemn
such monopolistic reorganizations, nor did it define what
constituted "undue restraint of trade," so the new holding
companies were allowed to operate freely (Seager & Gulick,
1973) . By thus replacing the trade associations with
similarly structured holding companies, businesses could
continue to control prices and production schedules. In
1889 New Jersey passed legislation explicitly to facilitate
mergers and bring additional state revenue. It encouraged
the formation of the heretofore questionable holding
companies by endorsing their legality. (Cochran, 1977)
C. FIRST SIGNIFICANT MERGER MOVEMENT: 1898-1903
The merger activity of 1890-1893 was overshadowed by the
number of mergers that occurred around the turn of the
century. Between 1898 and 1903 more mergers took place in
the United States than in any other nation. This new wave
reflected the favorable conditions of domestic financial
markets and the Supreme Court decisions regarding the
Sherman Antitrust Act. In 1895 the Court upheld the
legality of the American Sugar Refining Company as a holding
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company exempt from Sherman Act jurisdiction, thus
encouraging the continuation of the growth trend started a
decade earlier (Chandler, 1977). Investors, investment
bankers, and brokers had been looking for ways to market or
obtain new market securities and industrial mergers seemed
to be a promising source. As a result of such keen
interest, by 1903 40 new industrial companies had grown to
over $50 million in assets, all through merger.
Not only were the numbers of mergers growing, but the
size of the participants was also increasing. The first
megamerger, i.e., the combination of already large firms,
came about in 1901 when United States Steel was formed by
combining Carnegie Steel Corporation with several of its
rivals (Davidson, 1985) . The resultant $1 billion firm
controlled almost 60% of the steel industry's output by
year's end. The National Biscuit Company that formed
through a three-firm merger in 1898 took advantage of new
department and managerial consolidations and reorganizations
to become a formidable competitor for the likes of Quaker
Oats and Pillsbury.
Dominant forces such as improved technology, market
controls, easy money markets, stock speculation, and more
responsive management structures all led to bigger companies
(Cochran, 1977) . These motivating forces and the resultant
mergers did not guarantee success, however, unless firms
were able to utilize resources more efficiently and apply
21
the new technology of mass production to respond to the
growing and diverse markets. In general, horizontal mergers
were the most common and the successful ones met two
conditions. First, they were able to consolidate
production, centralize administration, and build their own
purchasing and marketing operations. Second, they operated
in industries where the technology and markets permitted the
integration necessary to increase speed and lower the cost
of materials during production and distribution (Chandler,
1977) . This included industries such as food processing,
complex machinery, chemicals, and primary metals. In any
case, to ensure success, managerial hierarchies had to be
created to guarantee the first condition mentioned above.
The major mergers that survived this period, such as Quaker
Oats, American Tobacco, DuPont, Otis Elevator, U.S. Steel,
and International Harvester, all integrated along the same
structural lines (Chandler, 1977)
.
D. EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: 1903-194
During the first two decades of the 2 0th century there
were few developments in merger trends. At the end of World
War I, mergers were still concentrated in the integrated
manufacturing and processing industries that first exercised
such expansion in the 1880s (Chandler, 1977) . The large
industrial enterprise continued to prosper when it used
capital-intensive, energy-consuming, continuous production
technology to produce for mass markets. It catered to
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numerous consumers who demanded high-volume flows of
merchandise. The firm was able to maintain its success
through integrated, coordinated administration that brought
reduced costs and barriers to outside entry. (Chandler,
1977) .
Following the merger wave that ended in 1903, the
previous horizontal growth pattern gradually shifted to
vertical integration as the primary means of external
growth. One advantage of vertical merger was that it posed
less of a threat of monopoly to the market. The Clayton Act
of 1914 reinforced the Sherman Antitrust Act by placing
additional constraints on activities that served to lessen
competition. (Nelson, 1959) Many of these constraints were
aimed directly at horizontal mergers. The Federal Trade
Commission established by the Act concentrated its early
efforts on collecting information on business practices and
recommending prosecution where antitrust violations were
suspected (Nelson, 1959) . Another advantage of vertical
merger was that such expansion enabled the business to
obtain badly needed marketing and purchasing support for
centralizing its manufacturing operations. Vertical
expansion proved to be the least expensive and most
efficient way to control both facets of product
dissemination, thus establishing a more firm competitive
position. (Steiner, 1975)
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The following examples illustrate typical merger
activity. In the food and tobacco industries where modern
industrial enterprise first began, the early pioneers were
still the leaders. By expanding product lines, marketing
procedures, and processing capabilities, firms such as
Armour Meats, Anheuser Busch, Quaker Oats, Heinz, and Coca-
Cola all maintained large shares of the market. The oil
industry was spurred by new and expanding automobile-related
markets as well as new sources of crude oil. Although
Standard Oil was forced to dismember in 1911, it continued
to expand operations along with Gulf, Union, Shell, and Sun
Oil Companies. In the glass, paper and chemical industries,
where most consumers were other producers, expansion took
place almost exclusively through merger. Companies such as
DuPont and Union Carbide that had originally been formed by
horizontal merger, now continued to dominate the market
through vertical expansion. In the machinery making
industry, mergers such as International Harvester, Allis-
Chalmers, and General Electric were initiated to obtain
complementary product lines using the same marketing and
purchasing organizations. (Chandler, 1977)
Merger activity remained relatively constant until the
second major rise in mergers occurred in the late 192 0s.
Hundreds of firms had gone public during the 1898-1903
merger wave in the hopes that ownership spread among widely
scattered shareholders would serve as protection against
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adverse public opinion or further legislation. Because of
such offerings and extensive speculation by investors,
companies had built large surpluses of earnings. Their
stocks were typically being traded at prices much lower than
the true value of the business, thus making them desirable
targets for takeover. Additionally, the reduced capital
investments that took place due to excess plant capacity
caused business to resort to merger in an attempt to better
utilize existing facilities and maintain production. The
depression of 1920 to 1933 and the post-depression
reconstruction period brought an abrupt end to the merger
activity that had peaked between 1926 and 1928. (Chandler,
1977)
E. CURRENT MERGER ACTIVITY: 19 4 -PRESENT
It took until the mid-1940s for the economy to improve
to the point where mergers were once again popular. World
War II and the economic boom that followed brought
production to capacity level along with renewed incentives
for growth. Although somewhat concentrated, government
contracting began to play a major role in maximizing plant
utilization. Military procurement policies required relying
on a relatively small number of defense contractors,
primarily in aerospace, electronics, and chemicals but in




Government continued to keep a close watch over merger
activity and in 1950 passed the Cellar-Kefauver Act to block
any mergers that were against the public interest. This
extension of the 1914 Clayton Act served to effectively bar
many horizontal or vertical mergers that might otherwise
have occurred in the years to follow (Benston, 1980)
.
However, while intensifying the antitrust climate against
such mergers, the act did not specifically prohibit
conglomerate mergers which continued to rise as more
businesses opted for this form of expansion. The real or
perceived benefits from mergers had become enticing enough
that if certain types of mergers became blocked (vertical
and horizontal), others would arise. After 1950,
conglomerates increased to constitute 71% of all mergers and
the overall merger wave continued until the peak year of
1966 saw nine times as many acquisitions as took place in
1941 (Mueller, 1986)
.
Paralleling the escalation of the Vietnam War, the last
half of the 1960s witnessed a dramatic increase in the
number of conglomerate acquisitions, particularly a rise in
the mergers of very large companies. Between 1961 and 1968
Gulf & Western completed 67 acquisitions, Textron, Inc. 50,
Georgia-Pacific 45, Litton Industries 79, and Teledyne 125
(Steiner, 1975) . A major distinguishing feature of the
mergers that occurred during this period was the extent to
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which they diversified the product mixes of the acquiring
firms (Mueller, 1986)
.
One reason for such rampant conglomerate behavior was
the lack of public or government outcry against such
mergers. Through conglomerate merger, the opportunities for
creating a monopoly were considered small because the
conglomerate gained no real increase in the market share.
Unlike horizontal, or to a lesser extent vertical mergers,
conglomerates had no direct anticompetitive effects and thus
were not a threatening form of growth (Steiner, 1975)
.
Although the potential benefits in terms of economies of
scale or efficiencies of operation are less obvious, they
have remained a fairly unchallenged form of expansion.
The late 197 0s brought another outbreak of merger
activity. Runaway inflation had picked up speed by 197 6
causing many companies to be undervalued on the stock market
and thus prime targets for takeover. Acquisitions increased
23% that year over 1975 levels, another 8% in 1977, and
almost 18% in 1978 (Mergers & Acquisitions, Spring 1978)
Large deals ballooned as industry giants enjoyed record cash
flows. Corporate executives were finding it less costly
over the long term to acquire another company rather than to
diversify or expand an existing operation. (Mergers &
Acquisitions, Spring 1978)
Mergers took place in all areas of industry. In 1978
the second largest deal in merger history took place when
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DuPont acquired Christiana Securities for $1.6 billion
(Mergers & Acquisitions, Spring 1978) . The most active
merger activity continued to occur in heavy manufacturing
and the oil and mining industries where leaders such as
Atlantic Richfield, Gulf Oil, Champion International, and
Johns-Manville continued to diversify and expand. Newspaper
publishing companies became sought-after merger targets as
the high costs of TV advertising forced many businesses to
utilize newspapers. Food processors such as Beatrice Foods,
Pepsi-Cola, and Coca-Cola led the merger wave. The so-
called "merger mania" lasted well into the early 1980s when
the ebb of business recession once again slowed activity to
more moderate levels. (Mueller, 1986)
Following the brief recession of 1980 to 1983, the last
few years have seen a gradual increase in mergers,
particularly conglomerates. Whether or not this activity
will ever lead to a dangerous level of industry
concentration remains to be seen. (Mueller, 1986) To date
it does not appear as though this conglomerate merger
activity presents a threat; it is debatable whether they
even constitute a particularly significant proportion of the
total industrial growth that is still led by internal growth
or de novo entry of small, developing enterprises.
F. REASONS FOR GROWTH VIA MERGER
Because of the widespread effects of mergers on the
marketplace in general, and shareholders, management, and
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employees in particular, merger activity typically gains
considerable attention from all sectors. Several of these
effects are presented following a discussion of the
motivations for merger growth.
The motivations for mergers can be divided into two
categories. The first category includes the internal
operating effects of mergers. Major considerations in this
area include a well-defined notion of profitability for both
the buyer and seller, whether the stockholders or the
managers are the decision makers, each party's valuation of
the target's stock, outside synergies, and any external or
internal conflicts of interest (Steiner, 1975) . Synergistic
effects, or additional benefits derived from the combination
of two businesses, is central to many of these (Block &
Hirt, 1984). Increased economies of scale through synergy
are a major benefit of mergers and include the following
(Benston, 1980)
:
- More efficient joint production taking advantage of
scale economies and a greater range of products
- Integrated facilities to reduce transportation costs and
supply uncertainty, as well as better coordination of
facilities
- More efficient distribution, including sales,
warehousing, shipping, and advertising
- Research and development savings
- Lower financing costs because of greater access to
finance markets
- Lower administration costs.
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other synergies include the tax incentives of shifting
resources from one industry to another without paying taxes
and acquiring unutilized tax-loss carryovers, unused
investment credit carryovers, and tax deferrals on credit
sales (Steiner, 1975) . Stock market speculation, the level
of investors' information and beliefs, and other
artificialities such as goodwill and subjective market
feelings all create external synergies that can enhance
expectations of future potential earnings (Steiner, 1975)
.
The second category of motivations for merger comprises
the external market effects. The portfolio effect of
combining two enterprises is one external financial motive
whereby risk is reduced through diversification and the
leveling effect on business cycles (Block & Hirt, 1984)
.
In addition to the portfolio effect, there may be
additional motives specific to the shareholders of the
target firm. These shareholders may wish to receive the
acquiring company's stock because of its greater
acceptability or perceived value (Block & Hirt, 1984)
.
Additionally, gains in the value of their own stock at the
time of a tender offer typically run 14-20%, reflecting a
beneficial repricing of previously undervalued assets
(Benston, 1980) . These shareholders may feel that the
merger is a good opportunity to take advantage of the




stockholders of the acquiring firm may see potential
gains through the installation of their own perceived
superior managerial ability and resultant improvement in the
target's profitability. Fast-paced growth through merger
may be understood as the only profitable way to compete in
the marketplace. Finally, as with the target shareholders,
the acquiring owners may look at the merger as an
opportunity to capitalize on the raw materials or
specialized market of the new company. (Steiner, 1975)
To summarize, the list of postulated merger motivations
is extensive and diverse depending on the predominant
participants. Economies of scale, growth motivation,
speculation, and increased market potential all enter into
the merger decision to varying degrees. The following
discussion addresses the effects of these mergers on the
participants as well as the rest of society.
G. SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MERGERS: PROS AND CONS
One of the most controversial effects of mergers, at
least from the government standpoint, deals with the impact
on the consumer. Merger supporters present the argument
that the resources saved by more efficient operations and
better control lead to increased output and a higher
standard of living. Further, they suggest that conglomerate
mergers may actually increase competition by revitalizing an
otherwise ailing firm so that it contributes more to that
industry's output. (Benston, 1980) Opponents argue that
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monopolistic effects are almost guaranteed regardless of
merger type and that government legislation has not gone far
enough to regulate mergers. Recent airfare increases as a
result of numerous major airline mergers provide some
support for the latter argument (Dahl & Brown, 1987)
.
Company employees and the surrounding community could
either gain or lose through merger activity. In many cases,
horizontal mergers consolidate operations and thus might
eliminate certain job requirements. However, the opposite
may occur with conglomerate mergers where greater
investments in new plant and equipment result in company
expansion. In this instance employees are provided with
more opportunities for advancement, better training, greater
job stability, and more prestige (Benston, 1980) . Mueller
(1977) disputes this advantage of mergers in that he argues
a major cost of external expansion as the loss of more
socially productive forms of growth. He states that
"mergers compete directly with capital investment, research
and development, and other investment type expenditures for
cash flows and managerial decision-making capacities."
Merger effects on the general public primarily concern
the increased concentration in market power that follows. A
key fear of conglomerate mergers is that reciprocity, or the
sales of products between business affiliates at
significantly reduced prices, will fraudulently undermine
competition (Steiner, 1975) . Several types of reciprocity
32
can occur, many of them without merger, and thus far studies
suggest that even where reciprocity takes place, its adverse
effects on competition are nonexistent or at most
insignificant (Steiner, 1975) . The increased economic power
of the merger giants is another fear that is apparently
unwarranted. Because consumers have such a wide variety of
products to choose from and a great ability to use
substitutes, it is currently not possible for corporations
to wield enough power to control the economy (Benston,
1980) .
Specific benefits and costs can be associated with
mergers as well as with any other form of business growth or
internal activity. Steiner (1975) refers to mergers as "a
mixed bag of motives and probable effects." In regulating
merger activity, he recommends that guidelines should be
established to distinguish between potentially adverse
merger activity and whether overall effects will be large or
small. Currently, the courts oppose acquisitions if
competition is adversely effected by any one of the
following factors: the elimination of a de novo entrant,
the elimination of a firm threatening the market frontier,
the entry via merger of a large producer rather than an
available smaller one, or an entry that increases the




This chapter covered the history of U.S. merger activity
and the increasingly widespread role of mergers in all areas
of business and industry. Government legislation to control
mergers and the mixed public sentiment regarding mergers
were also presented. The discussion of the internal and
external motivations for mergers demonstrates some of the
reasons why such growth strategies are selected despite
public dissent and intensified government scrutiny.
Increased economies of scale, tax incentives, better
utilization of capital and management resources, increased
market potential, and shareholder profitability all serve as
major inducements to merger.
Having presented this general treatment of mergers and
acquisitions, the following chapter looks more specifically
at the concept of organizational slack and how mergers might
impact upon the amount of slack resources available to a
firm.
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter discussed the growing popularity of
mergers and acquisitions as a means of growth. As merger
activity becomes more widespread, the concern with the
economic and social benefits and effects of mergers and
acquisitions becomes more important.
This chapter introduces the concept of organizational
slack and attempts to establish the significance of studying
the relationship between mergers and their effect on the
subsequent amount of organizational slack within the firms
involved. Following a review of representative studies of
organizational slack, suggested definitions are presented.
Next, the basis for hypothesizing a relationship between
slack and mergers is proposed. Finally, various methods of
measuring organizational slack are listed along with the
operational financial measure proposed by Bourgeois and
Singh that will serve as the measurement instrument for this
thesis.
B. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Although the idea of reserve economic resources being
available to firms has been alluded to for decades, it was
March and Simon (1958) who introduced the concept of
"organizational slack" in discussing business 's ability to
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react to economic and environmental fluctuations.
Specifically, they suggested that slack is one factor
affecting the goals of an organization and as such directly
impacts on intergroup conflicts. When resources are
plentiful, subordinate claims are not challenged and goal
differentiation occurs; when resources become restricted,
group interactions become more competitive, conflict
increases, and diversification of goals is reduced (March &
Simon, 1958)
.
Cyert and March (1963) refined the concept of
organizational slack and further suggested that slack serves
to stabilize an organization in two ways: 1) by absorbing
excess resources it restricts the levels of aspiration
during good times, and 2) by providing a pool of emergency
resources, it allows aspirations to be maintained during bad
times. In this manner, slack absorbs a substantial share of
the potential variability in a firm's environment, thus
dampening the wide fluctuations that might otherwise occur
(Cyert & March, 1963). Similarly, slack can play a role in
permitting the organization to effectively deal with
uncertainty; a firm that uses slack to absorb the
consequences of uncertainty does not have to rely as heavily
upon other devices to control its environment (Cyert &
March, 1963) . Although advantageous to the firm, Cyert and
March contend that management does not deliberately monitor
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or create slack; rather, slack serves as an unintended
consequence of the resource allocation process (Wolf, 1971)
.
Williamson (1963) takes a more managerial approach to
the concept of organizational slack. He considers
management to be the dominant group that controls the
activities of the firm in order to achieve certain self-
seeking objectives. As such, the managers operate
principally to maximize a utility function consisting of
salaries, staff, discretionary investment spending, and
management slack absorbed as costs (Williamson, 1963).
Economic conditions have a direct impact on slack. When the
economy is favorable, managerial expenditures are allowed to
absorb large quantities of uncommitted (slack) resources
without exceeding their availability. As the economy
becomes less favorable, staff levels, discretionary
spending, and the amount of management slack expenditures
are all reduced (Williamson, 1963). Excess resources will
tend to disappear under adverse economic conditions and
management becomes more constrained in its operations.
Williamson implies that slack is not readily recovered
during these periods of poor economic conditions because
management is hesitant to yield to the overriding forces
compelling them to satisfy their own personal needs
(Williamson, 1963)
.
Wolf (1971) utilizes the concepts developed by
Williamson and Cyert & March to look at methods of reducing
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organizational inefficiency. He distinguishes two kinds of
organizational slack— intentional and unintentional—and
claims that management should continually strive to reduce
both kinds of slack (Wolf, 1971) . Unintentional slack is
created because management lacks the information necessary
to allocate resources at an optimal level, primarily because
of inexperience or human decision-making limitations.
Intentional slack is the deliberate assignment of resources
and creation of slack in order to effectively deal with
uncertainty. In either case, management is the primary
determinant of the amount of organizational slack created.
Through management, resources are either allowed to be
expended on discretionary slack items or on more productive
activities to increase profits (Wolf, 1971) . As proof. Wolf
suggests that better managed companies typically demonstrate
better records of growth in operating profits as well as
more constrained levels of organizational slack.
Onsi (1975) used various simulation models to
investigate economic factors that affect slack in monopoly
companies. He suggested that organization members create
slack as a result of imperfections in the allocation of
scarce resources and the bargaining process involved in
attaining those resources. Onsi found that sales stability
was a significant factor in slack build-up. The sales
forces of companies operating under large sales fluctuations
were under greater pressure and thus were forced to maintain
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lower slack levels. Managerial behavior was another major
factor. Managers demonstrating active slack behavior, i.e.,
those who actively sought the utilization of excess
resources, showed higher levels of profitability over the
long run than those practicing neutral, or conservative
managerial behavior.
Litschert and Bonham (1978) developed a theoretical
model which suggested that slack affects the relationship
between an organization's strategy and structure by
influencing the extent of the required fit between
organizational structure and the environment. They
determined that when the amount of slack is low, no excess
resources are available to allow deviation in structural
design. The kind of structure that occurs will be
contingent on technology and the external environment.
Because the necessary fit is tight, the organizational
strategy pursued is determined strictly by the structure
(Litschert & Bonham, 1978) . When the amount of slack is
high, more excess resources are available, thereby allowing
more structural flexibility. In this case, the necessary
fit between strategy and structure may be loose because
economic sacrifices are less likely to occur. Now the
organizational strategy will be more contingent on the
attitudes and values of the dominant coalition (Litschert &
Bonham, 1978) .
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In studying human resource policy decisions, Dimick and
Murray (1978) suggest a close correlation between
organization size and organizational slack. They found that
firm size and the availability of slack both make various
types of human resource policies more affordable. Extensive
selection procedures, employee training programs, and more
sophisticated performance appraisal methods were observed
both in large organizations and in those with more slack
(Dimick & Murray, 1978)
.
Hage (1980) later disputed the findings of both
Litschert & Bonham and Dimick & Murray stating that sheer
size and the availability of organizational slack do not
necessarily imply strategic innovations. Unless a firm has
adequate managerial know-how to be able to utilize slack
effectively, advancements in research and development, long-
range planning, and new technologies won't be realized.
Where such managerial expertise exists, as with IBM, DuPont,
and Kodak, underutilized slack is effectively employed to
develop and exploit new technologies and consequently
dominate the marketplace within each highly specialized
field (Hage, 1980)
.
In a 1981 study. Bourgeois alluded to two opposing views
of how slack promotes political activity within the firm.
On one hand, Cyert and March (1963) stated that slack
reduces political activity because the surplus of resources
eliminates the need to compete during the allocation
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process. Conversely, Astley (1978) suggested that slack
promotes political activity because as new slack
materializes, it becomes available for use and thus will be
actively sought by competitive members. (Bourgeois, 1981)
Bourgeois and Singh (1982) tested several hypotheses
relating slack to strategic and political behavior among
management teams. Utilizing an empirical measure of
organizational slack comprised of several financial
indicators, they found that three separate dimensions of
slack could be distinguished. Recoverable slack, or those
resources already absorbed into the organization as excess
costs, served to reduce political behavior. Potential slack
consisting of the firm's capacity to generate future extra
resources showed the opposite effect of increasing political
behavior by promoting goal disagreement and managerial
conflict. The last type, available slack, consisted of
liquid resources not yet assimilated into the design of the
firm. These available resources had no appreciable effect
on behavior, possibly because they were already committed to
meeting short term obligations.
In one of the most comprehensive studies of
organizational slack to date, Singh (1983) proposed and
tested several hypotheses relating performance, slack, and
risk taking in strategic managerial decision making. To
study these relationships, he suggested a two-component
concept of organizational slack. Absorbed, or recoverable
41
slack, consisted of those resources that are already
incorporated into the operations of the organization in the
form of excess costs. Unabsorbed slack consists of readily-
available resources in excess of those currently obligated
to operations. This distinction was necessary to explain
the different effects of the two types of slack on
performance.
Following the theory of Cyert and March, Singh tested
the hypothesis that organizational slack increases with good
performance and decreases with poor performance. He further
suggested that organizational slack should have a positive
effect on risk taking in strategic decisions. Singh found
that better performance does in fact lead to greater
absorbed and unabsorbed slack. However, although greater
absorbed slack leads to increased risk taking, greater
unabsorbed slack apparently does not. He therefore
concluded that better performance leads only to higher
levels of absorbed slack, which in turn allows for
additional risk taking. On the other hand, unabsorbed slack
has no effect on risk taking, possibly because uncommitted
resources do not play the same buffering role when they are
"outside the workflow of the organization" as do absorbed
resources that are an integral part of organizational
activities.
Singh (1983) also used the distinction between two types
of slack to look at the hypothesis that organizational slack
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has a positive effect on decentralization, which in turn
should have a positive effect on risk taking. Although he
found that performance and decentralization were directly
related, his prediction that absorbed and unabsorbed slack
should increase decentralization of decision-making was not
supported. He assumed that controls would become tight in
organizations with limited slack, thereby reducing
decentralization, but his negative result didn't support the
hypothesis. Despite the somewhat conflicting results and
sampling limitations of his study, Singh's research showed
some of the positive consequences of slack in organizations.
In particular, absorbed slack encouraged increased risk
taking and thus better performance by allowing the
possibility of failure without destructive consequences.
In a more recent study, Antle and Eppen (1985) studied
organizational slack and capital rationing in capital
budgeting situations. They distinguished between the
priorities of the owners and those of the managers regarding
the optimal levels of slack in a firm. The owner's goal is
simply to maximize the expected present value of the firm's
investment. On the other hand, management's goal is to
maximize organizational slack, which Antle and Eppen define
as the difference between the budget allocation and the
actual amount that the firm needs to invest to achieve its
desired rate of return. Management's desire for slack comes
from two major considerations: the uncertainty of specific
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capital intensive ventures, and the desire to include all
related, but not essential, expenditures such as travel and
training in the budgeting process (Antle & Eppen, 1985)
.
Thus, the authors address the managerial abuse of
organizational slack as something that the firm's owners
must scrutinize.
Poynter and White (1985) looked at the management of
organizational slack in 36 foreign subsidiaries of major
multinational enterprises. They defined slack in terms of
the human resources in excess of the current needs of the
enterprise and stated that such slack was particularly
important in these firms because it was directly related to
their ability to innovate and generate new strategies.
Although slack could be efficiently used to address
operational problems or to take advantage of opportunities
outside the realm of the existing business, the two issues
of the amount and kind of slack available were examined in
order to determine causes of unnecessary slack and the
particular slack resources most instrumental in devising
future managerial strategies (Poynter & White, 1985)
Unnecessary slack could easily come about after a new
product line was introduced and subsequent requirements to
maintain skill levels declined. Unless effectively used to
exploit new opportunities, such unused resources would
eventually reduce return on investment. Although the
prospects for growth and renewal from slack human resources
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might be desired in independent firms, Poynter and White did
not consider them advantageous to subsidiaries. Even though
slack could not be reduced completely, it was necessary to
align both the amount and kind of existing slack with the
organizational strategy suggested by environmental and
internal factors (Poynter & White, 1985)
.
Gershenberg (1986) showed that by measuring the amount
of slack in labor, capital, and management inputs, one may
find that internal growth and development are possible
without acquiring additional resources. By studying the
large amounts of slack available to several Kenyan
manufacturing firms, he found that better utilization of
already existing resources could lead to increased
productivity without expansion. Gershenberg (1986)
suggested that one solution to excessive slack would be to
establish new noncompeting firms; only such complementary
enterprises would reduce the overall amount of slack
resources within the economy.
The previous studies address several aspects of slack
but the majority of them treat the concept in terms of
managerial behavior and the effect of slack resources on
organizational decision making. Table 1 summarizes the
principal theories of slack.
In most cases a certain amount of slack is considered
desirable as a stabilizing mechanism to absorb excess
resources in prosperous times and provide emergency reserves
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TABLE 1



















Slack affects goals, impacts on inter-
group conflicts. Interactions become
more competitive as availability of slack
resources is restricted.
Slack stabilizes firms in two ways.
During good times excess resources are
absorbed, thereby restricting levels of
aspiration. In bad times, slack provides
a pool of emergency resources.
Managerial approach. Economic conditions
impact on slack levels and force manage-
ment to gauge expenditures, discretionary
spending, and staff levels accordingly.
Identifies two types of slack— intention-
al and unintentional—both of which lead
to inefficiencies. Management is tasked
with reducing both.
Members create slack as a result of
imperfections in allocating and bargain-
ing for scarce resources. Close correla-
tion between slack, sales stability, and
managerial behavior.
Slack treated as a moderating variable
affecting interactive effects of firm
structure and environment. Strategies
are affected by slack levels.
Suggest close correlation between slack
and firm size. Extent of human resource
policies are determined by the amount of
slack.
Managerial competence determines effec-
tive utilization of slack resources.











Conflicting theories of behavior elicited
by slack. Political activity may be
reduced by slack as more resources are
available to all managers; or, political
activity may be increased as managers
struggle to obtain more than their fair
share.
Distinguished three types of slack
—
available, recoverable, and potential—to
study the ease-of-recovery dimension of
slack on political behavior and strategic
decision making.
Distinguished between absorbed and
unabsorbed slack. Higher firm perform-
ance leads to greater amounts of both.
However, only higher levels of absorbed
slack lead to greater risk taking.
during bad times. Those material, managerial, and capital
resources not currently used to attain organizational goals
and objectives manifest themselves in a variety of ways.
One of the most obvious is through management action; slack
can be effectively utilized to promote research and
development, enhance long-range planning efforts, and
contribute to expansion, but only if management is competent
enough to exploit these resources fully. Slack can
influence political activity in the firm, depending on the
availability of various components of slack which in turn
have differing effects on political strategies. Slack was
also found to be related to levels of performance and risk
taking, further substantiating the relationship between
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slack and managerial actions. The studies conflict on
whether or not slack depends on the size of the
organization. Proponents argued that sheer size allowed for
more widespread human resource policies; opponents countered
that slack in itself will not lead to innovation unless
management is able to properly direct the use of slack
resources. In spite of various and often opposing views of
slack, the concept is associated with a wide range of
organizational strategies and behaviors.
C. DEFINITION OF ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK
The previous studies of organizational slack suggest
varying concepts of what constitutes slack. March and Simon
(1958) were the first to define slack as the difference
between the resources available to the organization and the
total requirements of the members of the organizational
coalition. Expanding on this idea, Cyert and March (1963)
defined slack as the total supply of uncommitted resources,
including those "funnelled into the satisfaction of
individual and subgroup objectives" (p. 98) . Examples of
slack are wages greater than those needed to keep labor,
excess dividends paid to stockholders, incentives paid to
executives, and subunit growth beyond the rate of relative
contribution (Cyert & March, 1963) . Litschert and Bonham
(1978) later used this definition to suggest that slack is
the increase from a comparable organizational norm reflected
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in such measures as return on equity, net sales, return on
total assets, and gross profit as a percent of sales.
Child (1972, p. 11) defined slack as "the margin or
surplus which permits an organization's dominant coalition
to adopt structural arrangements which accord with their own
preferences, even at some extra administrative cost."
Dimick and Murray (1978) stated that organizational
slack consists of resources that an organization acquired
over time and which are not committed to specific
expenditures. Rather, they are reserves that could be used
in whatever manner the firm desires.
Bourgeois (1981) offers perhaps the most succinct
definition when he paraphrases the work of March and Simon
as follows:
Organizational slack is that cushion of actual or
potential resources which allows an organization to adapt
successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to
external pressures for change in policy, as well as to
initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external
environment. (p. 30)
Bourgeois (1981) suggests that these slack resources serve
several vital functions to the organization. First, in the
form of higher wages or executive incentives, they are an
inducement for organizational members to stay with the firm.
Second, as a resource for conflict resolution, slack allows
the opportunity for exercising choice to be distributed
evenly to all participants in the organization. Third,
slack serves as a buffering mechanism in the workflow
process. Various environmental uncertainty problems are
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absorbed or reduced through the availability of slack
resources; the need to coordinate subunit activities tightly
is not as vital to maintaining smooth inter-departmental
production schedules when adequate slack resources exist.
Fourth, slack facilitates creative behavior. As more slack
is generated, the organization can afford to experiment with
new strategies such as introducing new products or entering
new markets. Slack also permits more acceptable satisficing
behavior by reducing the amount of selection criteria by
which an alternative is considered feasible. (Bourgeois,
1981)
Despite minor disagreements as to what constitutes
organizational slack, most researchers agree that it is an
excess of uncommitted resources that result from performance
above some anticipated level (Singh, 1983). Exactly how
slack is defined is a function of the research measurement
tool used and a wide range of subjective and objective
measures have been suggested. The measurement difficulties
associated with slack are discussed in the last section of
this chapter.
D. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK AND MERGERS
Dimick and Murray (1978) concluded that organizational
slack generally increases with firm size. Wolf's (1971)
earlier finding that the size of a firm does not necessarily
influence its slack levels runs contrary to these results
and suggests that the particular behavior that regulates
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slack may vary depending on the firm's management
philosophy. Kwoka and Warren-Boulton (1986) suggest that
firm size must be accounted for in comparing any aspect of
efficiency. The greater economies of scale commensurate
with larger firms may well lead to greater profitability,
faster growth, or lower unit costs while slack levels still
remain relatively high. Whether or not increased size comes
about through internal growth or merger is not addressed in
any of these studies. However, Wolf (1971) suggests
differing outcomes through external expansion (e.g., merger
or consolidation) stating that the likelihood of reducing
slack (considered beneficial) is better if changes in top
management occur from outside the organization.
In 1982, Teece offered a more explicit relationship
between growth and its effect on organizational slack. He
states that diversification may be efficiency-driven as a
means to better utilize slack resources. The profit-
motivated firm is faced with three possible choices for
reinvesting or employing slack resources: 1) the firm can
sell the services of its unused assets to other firms in
other markets, 2) it can diversify into other markets
through merger or internal (de novo) expansion, or 3) if
the slack is in cash, it could return a portion to
shareholders as dividends or stock repurchases. (Teece,
1982)
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Teece (1982) suggests that when the transaction costs of
options 1) and 3) become excessive, the firm will diversify.
In doing so, de novo expansion is preferred if slack
resources appear gradually over time. In this manner,
expansion can be incrementally tailored to the economic
environment. However, if slack resources occur suddenly,
e.g., through a major technological advancement or an
adverse change in demand, then merger is preferred. Whether
horizontal or conglomerate, it is expected that mergers and
acquisitions will minimize organizational slack in both
firms involved by channeling the excess resources of the
acquiring firm into productive use while also providing
greater managerial control over the acquired firm. (Teece,
1982)
A further distinction must be made on the basis of the
type of merger. For this study, mergers are categorized as
either horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate. Fisher and
Lande (1983) state that the type of merger will lead to
varying efficiencies in the resultant operation. They
contend that horizontal mergers should cause the greatest
efficiencies, or reduced levels of slack, because of the
synergistic savings from combining research and development,
marketing, management, distribution, and production
compatibilities, and the resultant increase in market
domination. Based on this argument, vertical mergers would
show less improvement and the amount of slack in
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conglomerates would be changed to an even lesser degree. In
fact, more slack may even be generated because of reduced
transaction costs, particularly in vertical mergers. Arnold
(1984) questions the ease of integration and realization of
synergies regardless of the merger type. He states that
particularly in manufacturing, even companies with very
similar product lines may not see as great an improvement as
expected because of slight tooling variances, incompatible
production methods, or a disregard for personnel considera-
tions. Literature suggests that the effects of different
types of mergers are not generally agreed upon and each type
must be analyzed separately.
Based on the above arguments, it is expected that
horizontal mergers will show the greatest reduction in
slack. Both vertical and conglomerate mergers should show
lesser reductions. While both vertical and conglomerate
mergers may have smaller overall synergistic savings, they
might also see more slack generated as a result of reduced
transaction costs so that the combined effects will be
offset.
E. DEVELOPING AN OPERATIONAL MEASURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL
SLACK
Having discussed some of the definitions and functions
of organizational slack, it becomes evident that it is a
difficult concept to operationalize. Although researchers
generally agree that slack consists of excess resources over
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and above those required for the firm's operations, there is
no operational definition of the optimal amount of slack.
Additionally, it is not clear that optimal levels are the
same from one industry to the next. Depending on
inconsistencies in business cycles, fluctuations in the
market, relative scarcity of raw materials, and countless
other economic factors, industries may require varying
amounts of slack. Deciding how much slack constitutes the
industry norm, quantitatively measuring that slack, and then
measuring and comparing the amount of slack within the
individual firms in that industry are not insignificant
matters.
Several methods of measuring organizational slack have
been proposed and tested in the literature. One procedure
that reappears from time to time is the use of question-
naires. Besides relying on a more objective measure based
on return on investment, Odell (1972) used a questionnaire
to derive a perceptual measure of slack based on perceived
differences between a firm's inducements and contributions.
Later, Kmetz (1980) used three sets of questionnaires to
measure slack resources, slack performance, and production
smoothing. Gershenberg (1986) estimated the amounts of
labor, capital, and management slack by using surveys which
asked whether the use of resources would change if the
current level of demand were increased by some percent. If
not, that maximum percentage level was considered to be the
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amount of available slack. These survey procedures all rely
on organizational members to supply the data; consequently,
their subjectivity and susceptibility to misinterpretation
cannot be avoided. A consistent, quantitative measure of
slack that can be used for comparative empirical examination
cannot be derived from these qualitative methods.
Dimick and Murray (1978) used a more quantitative
measure by determining average net profit over a five-year
period, controlled for organizational size. Wolf (1971)
used selling, general, and administrative expenses as a
measure of slack on the basis of the intensive scrutiny that
these expenditures come under when resources become scarce.
He then used operating profit as a measure of available
resources and studied the relationship between the two.
Although these measures are more objective and suitable to
analysis, they are both somewhat narrowly-defined and do not
adequately consider all the aspects of organizational slack.
Bourgeois (1981) introduced a more extensive use of
public financial records as a means to detect and differen-
tiate various levels of slack. Because financial data have
little meaning in isolation, he emphasized the need to look
at changes in organizational slack over time, not just
absolute amounts. Comparative analysis was advocated which
looked at trends in the data.
Bourgeois distinguished between two sources of slack:
internal and external. Internal slack was created by
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certain managerial actions and was reflected in changes in
retained earnings (RE) , dividend payments (DP)
,
general and
administrative expenses (G&A) , working capital as a
percentage of sales (WC/S) , and the debt/equity ratio (D/E)
.
External slack consisted of those resources made available
by the environment. This slack was identified by changes in
credit rating (CR) , the difference between interest rate
paid on short-term loans and the prime lending rate (I/P)
,
and the price-earnings ratio (P/E) . His model is summarized
below:
change in slack
= f(change in RE, DP, G&A, WC/S, D/E, CR, I/P, P/E)
Increases in RE, G&A, WC/S, CR, and P/E would all indicate
increases in organizational slack, while decreases in DP,
D/E, and I/P would similarly show increases. (Bourgeois,
1981)
Bourgeois and Singh (1983) developed this framework
further by identifying a three-component model of slack that
distinguished between available, recoverable, and potential
slack. Available slack consists of those resources not yet
assimilated into the design of the organization. They are
measured by increases in (net profit - dividends) /sales and
(cash + securities - current liabilities)/sales, and
decreases in dividends/net worth. Recoverable slack
consists of those resources already absorbed that could
56
still be recovered. These are measured by increases in
accounts receivable/sales, inventory/sales, and (general and
administrative expenses) /sales. Potential slack is the
capacity to generate additional resources from the
environment. These appear as reductions in long-term
debt/net worth and increases in the price/earnings ratio.
Each of these measures is then combined algebraically within
each of the three categories and an overall measure of slack
is derived by summing the three. (Bourgeois & Singh, 1982)
This more comprehensive measure of organizational slack is
the method utilized to investigate the relationship proposed
in this thesis.
F. SUMMARY
Several studies have been presented in an attempt to
conceptualize organizational slack as a resource that plays
a very definite role in affecting a firm's behavior. Slack
resources can serve to stabilize an organization by
regulating output and allowing for more structural
flexibility in maintaining a proper fit between the firm and
its environment. It impinges directly on managerial
decisions and affects the political climate of an
organization. Slack is most generally defined as an excess
of resources that allows an organization to adapt to
external pressures and to initiate changes in strategy with
respect to those external considerations.
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The relationship between slack and mergers was examined.
It was hypothesized that firms engaging in mergers should
experience a more efficient utilization of resources and
consequently a reduction in slack. It was further
hypothesized that firms engaging in mergers should
experience a more efficient utilization of resources and
consequently a reduction in slack. It was further
hypothesized that the degree of slack reduction would depend
on the merger type.
Subjective and objective measures of organizational
slack were discussed along with the reasons for rejecting
questionnaires and less comprehensive quantitative measures
as biased and incomplete. Instead, the three-component
model of slack suggested by Bourgeois and Singh is
recommended. This model utilizes public financial data to
derive a precise and comprehensive quantitative measure of
slack.
The next chapter addresses the research design used to
investigate the relationship between slack and mergers, and
discusses the Bourgeois and Singh measurement model more
thoroughly. Data collection and analysis methods are also
presented.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters dealt with corporate merger
activity and incentives for business to engage in such
activity. The concept of organizational slack was presented
along with the suggested relationship between slack and
merger activity.
This chapter begins by stating the empirical hypotheses
which form the basis for this study. Next, the research
method is presented in terms of the setting, experimental
samples, and data collection procedures. Finally, the
Bourgeois and Singh model of organizational slack as applied
in this thesis is explained in more detail.
B. EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES
In the past, peak merger waves have raised the same
issues: what effects will the extensive merger activity
have on society, and will the economy as its exists today be
swallowed up by a handful of corporate giants? Although
historians such as Chandler (1977) suggest that corporate
growth and diversification are often engaged in merely to
put slack resources to work, society's primary concern has
been to impose a multitude of antitrust limitations on
merger activity. Legal restraints abound. (Benston, 1980)
Even in relatively small acquisitions, scores of investment
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bankers and specialized merger attorneys are required to
resolve the antitrust implications and attempt to reassure
the shareholders and the public that the merger is not a
destructive activity. Indeed, the number and size of recent
hostile takeovers and insider investment trading scandals
have made the public even more skeptical of any positive
benefits to be derived from mergers. (Davidson, 1985)
To date, studies of merger activity have shown little or
no increase in post-acquisition profitability (Steiner,
1975; Davidson, 1985; Mueller, 1986). In spite of various
motives for mergers, none of them seem to substantiate
themselves to any degree in the merged firms. No published
evidence has been found that measures enhanced managerial
and organizational effectiveness in terms of optimizing
slack. If it could be demonstrated that mergers and
acquisitions reduce the amount of slack in these firms, then
one could argue that a positive contribution to economic
efficiency is the result. Rather than viewing mergers as
monopolistic activities that threaten to take over business
and industry, these mergers might be more readily accepted
as contributors to increased productivity in the
marketplace.
This thesis specifically examines the effect of
corporate mergers and acquisitions on the amount of
orcranizational slack contained in the acquiring firms after
the merger . In the wake of research by Dimick and Murray
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(1978) and Teece (1972) , it is suggested that a reciprocal
relationship exists between mergers and slack. That is,
post-merger operations should demonstrate reduced levels of
organizational slack within the parties to the merger.
Specifically, this thesis proposes the following hypothesis:
H^: Mergers result in reduced levels of
organizational slack in the acquiring firm.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Fisher and Lande
(1983) suggest that the type of merger may lead to varying
efficiencies in the resultant operation. Horizontal mergers
would be expected to demonstrate the greatest slack
reduction because of savings through combined research and
development, marketing, management, and production.
Vertical and conglomerate mergers would realize lesser
degrees of savings because of less compatible production and
managerial techniques and thus less integration. In this
case a positive reduction would occur due to better access
to such things as capital markets. This suggests the second
hypothesis as follows:
H2 : Among merging firms, the type of merger affects the
resultant change in slack. Horizontal mergers are
expected to show the greatest reduction, followed
by vertical mergers, and finally conglomerates.
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Two major considerations prevailed in designing this
study. The first was data availability, or choosing a time
frame that would yield a pool of mergers ample enough to
provide for adequate statistical analysis. Choosing a
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narrow time frame in which many mergers occurred would
control for any economic or environmental fluctuations that
may otherwise bias the data. The second constraint was
imposed by the research question which required looking at
organizational slack for several years before and after the
merger took place.
The intensified merger activity of the late 1970s
provided a data base that satisfied both of these
requirements. In the five-year interval from 1973 to 1978
the number of annual mergers nearly doubled, with the major
upturn beginning in 1976. The two-year period from 1977 to
1978 was chosen to provide the merger sample for three
reasons. First, some 2,485 acquisitions occurred during
this time frame providing a large initial sample size.
Second, the data to analyze these firms had to be gathered
for several years before and after the merger; financial
data were readily available for that entire period. Third,
the economy was relatively stable between 1976 and 1978,
allowing treatment of the mergers as one group.
Broadly speaking, the methodological steps that comprise
this empirical analysis are summarized as follows:
(a) Identification of a sample of firms engaged in
mergers during 1977 and 1978.
(b) Categorization of sample firms by type of merger,
industry, and firm size.
(c) Identification of a matched sample of nonmerging
firms.
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(d) Collection of financial data for all sample firms for
the period from 1973 to 1982.
(e) Calculation of measures of organizational slack for
the test period using the Bourgeois and Singh
measurement model.
(f) Calculation of the change in slack for the sample
firms between the pre- and post-merger periods.
(g) Summation of individual measures of change in slack
to provide summary indicators of the aggregate change
in slack for each firm.
(h) Statistical tests comparing the change in slack
between merging and nonmerging firms.
(i) Statistical tests comparing the change in slack
between horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate
mergers.
(j) Statistical tests exploring the effects of industry
and firm size on the change in slack.
Items (a) through (e) are discussed more fully in the
remainder of the chapter. Items (f) through (j) are
addressed in Chapter V.
D. SAMPLE SELECTION
This study looks at mergers of medium to large sized
U.S. publicly held fiirms. The mergers were identified using
the quarterly roster published in Mergers and Acquisitions .
Each merger was initially screened on the basis of the
relative size between acquired and acquiring firms. Only
those mergers in which the size of the acquired company was
at least 10% of the acquiring firm (as determined by the
acquiring firm's total assets) were retained. Those mergers
that did not meet this criterion were excluded under the
assumption that the acquisition of a firm less than 10% of
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the buyer's size would have negligible effects on the
organizational slack or operating characteristics of the
larger firm.
The 10% size criterion mentioned above reduced the
sample size by approximately one-fourth, down to 1,680
mergers. Next, the cross-index of merging firms published
annually in Mergers and Acquisitions was used to eliminate
any firms that merged more than once between 1973 and 1982
and had been considered as part of the original sample.
This was done so that the effects of the other mergers would
not obscure any changes in the level of slack attributed to
the mergers under investigation. This procedure reduced the
merger sample to 198. Of these, 115 were privately owned
and thus were not included. Finally, mergers within the
banking and finance industries were deleted. The Bourgeois
and Singh framework for measuring organizational slack used
in this study is not applicable to such industries;
therefore, these mergers were not used.
Of the remaining 69 firms, 50 of them fit well into six
major industry groups as identified by their three-digit
standard industrial classifications (SICs) . Each of the
other 19 firms was contained in a different industry. In
order to focus on a limited number of industries for
matching purposes, these 19 were discarded. The industry
groups are listed in Table 2 below. Dun's Business Rankings










Electrical 351,353 14 12
Chemicals 261,263 10 9
Petroleum 131,132 5 5
Food Products 202,203 4 4
Office Products 357 4 1
the pool of businesses from which to choose the control
group
.
The merging firms were then divided into three
categories— large, medium, and small—on the basis of net
sales of the acquiring firms prior to the merger. The size
distinction is relative in that the firms considered are
among the largest 25% of all U.S. corporations. Natural
cutoffs were chosen that split the firms into three roughly
equal groups. The merging firms were also classified
according to merger type as either horizontal, vertical, or
conglomerate as identified in Mergers and Acquisitions .
Next, the control group of non-merging firms was selected to
match the mergers both in terms of size and SIC. The final
data base consists of 50 mergers and a control group of 43
firms that engaged in no mergers during the 1973 to 1982
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time frame. Financial data for these 93 firms were then
obtained either from Moody's Industrial Manuals or from the
annual 10-K reports filed with the SEC.
E. OPERATIONAL MEASURE OF SLACK
The previous chapter discussed several measures of
organizational slack. The one utilized in this study is the
financial model offered by Bourgeois and Singh (1983) . This
model is derived from Bourgeois' earlier model which
categorized slack as either internal or external. Internal
slack is created by managerial actions and external slack
becomes available through the environment, or factors
external to the organization. In spite of this distinction,
Bourgeois' model treats the components of slack as one
entity in which he combines the values of several individual
measures algebraically to elicit one value for slack. This
amount is then intended to show only relative changes in
slack and not to serve as an absolute quantity. Bourgeois
stated that tracing changes in slack was a more valid
approach than looking at absolute levels because of the
importance of treating financial data on a comparative
basis. Financial statistics typically have little meaning
in isolation; rather, balance sheet and income statement
data are more appropriately viewed in terms of trends
instead of single "snapshots" of a firm's position at one
point in time (Bourgeois, 1981)
.
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Bourgeois and Singh (1983) later devised a multidimen-
sional conceptualization of slack that accounted for some of
the discrepancies found in Bourgeois' earlier model. In
trying to operationalize the internal vs. external measure,
they found that they were actually looking at more than one
dimension. They regarded the revised financial measures as
lying along a continuum representing the ease with which the
particular slack resources could be recovered. For example,
cash and marketable securities are readily available
resources to the organization. On the other hand, accounts
receivable and overhead items such as inventories and G&A
expenses take more time and effort to reduce. The use of
inventories as a measure of slack is taken from its
consideration as a buffer mechanism proposed by Galbraith
(1973). Inventories serve as a buffer against variances
presented by environmental factors and their existence
allows for smoother, more uninterrupted production
processes. Raw materials and finished goods inventories
serve as technical buffers basic to the firm's operations
while work-in-process inventories represent interdepartmen-
tal buffers that allow for more flexibility between work
centers. Finally, the capital-raising potential represented
by changes in stock price is the most long-term source of
slack available through external sources.
To distinguish between the ease of recovery of the slack
resources. Bourgeois and Singh devised the three categories
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of available, recoverable, and potential slack. Table 3
summarizes the variables used to measure slack within each
category. The study is concerned with changes in slack from
pre- to post-merger periods; hence differences in these
variables over time are calculated. The signs indicate
whether slack increases (+) or decreases (-) as the variable
increases and in addition show how the measures were treated
when summed into aggregate measures of the change in slack
over time. Net sales is used as the denominator to control
for changes in the overall level of organizational activity
because short-term resources would be expected to change to
support varying levels of output. An additional benefit of
this control is that it allows a comparison of slack levels
between firms of different sizes.
TABLE 3











(Net Profit-Div) /Sales +
Dividends/Net Worth
(Cash+Securities-Curr Liab) /Sales +
Accounts Receivable/Sales +
Inventory/Sales +





This chapter discussed the main hypotheses posed by this
thesis. These are summarized below:
H]^: Mergers result in reduced levels of organizational
slack in the acquiring firm.
H2 : Among merging firms, the type of merger affects the
resultant change in slack. Horizontal mergers are
expected to show the greatest reduction, followed
by vertical mergers, and finally conglomerated.
This chapter also discussed the research design and
sources of data used in this study. The multidimensional
model of organizational slack using financial data to
provide relative quantitative measures was presented. Table
3 summarizes the dimensions and the slack measures used.
The next chapter discusses the analysis of the data
derived for organizational slack and the resultant research
findings.
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V. ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL
A. OVERVIEW
This chapter analyzes and interprets the data described
in the previous chapter. The raw financial data were used
to calculate the measures of organizational slack as
proposed by Bourgeois and Singh. First, a preliminary
description of the measures is presented. Next, the
statistical analyses are described. These consist of t-
statistics and analysis of variance (ANOVA) . Finally, a
discussion of the findings and empirical results is
presented in terms of the hypothesis that the amount of
slack in merged firms is expected to decrease following the
merger.
B. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS
Financial data were collected for the 50 acquiring
companies and 4 3 control companies as detailed in the
previous chapter. The data covered a nine-year period from
four years prior to the merger to four years after it
occurred. From these raw data, each of the eight slack
measures described in Table 3 was calculated for each sample
firm. This was done for four separate years: two and four
years prior to the merger and two and four years after the
merger. Next, average measures of pre-merger slack were
calculated by averaging the measures from two and four years
prior to the merger. Analogous average post-merger slack
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measures were calculated for two and four years after the
merger. Similar measures were calculated for the same time
periods for the nonmerging firms. Finally, the percent
changes between the pre- and post-merger levels were
calculated for the individual measures. This was done by
subtracting the average of the pre-merger quantities from
the average of the post-merger quantities and dividing by
the average of the pre-merger quantities. Since small
denominators can lead to extreme values for percent change
variables, measures of slack change greater than 200% or
less than -200% were truncated to + or - 200%. This was
done to reduce the effect of outliers on the statistical
tests. (Only 1.8% of the tests, or 11 firms, were affected
by this procedure.)
The individual measures of change were combined
algebraically by category into summary indicators of
available, recoverable, and potential slack using the signs
indicated in Table 3. Bourgeois and Singh (1983) submit
that addition into summary measures is appropriate because
the individual measures added are all percent change
measures and hence have the same scale and meaning. These
three summary indicators were then summed to obtain measures
of total change in slack. Tables 7 and 8 of the Appendix
summarize the changes in slack for each sample firm. The
table abbreviations are defined as follows:
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CHGAV Percent Change in Available Slack
CHGREC Percent Change in Recoverable Slack
CHGPOT Percent Change in Potential Slack
CHGTOT Percent Change in Total Slack
For display purposes, the individual firm results were
classified according to merger type and merging versus
nonmerging firms. Table 4 lists the means, standard
deviations, minimum, and maximum values for the slack change
indicators for each of the subgroups.
The table shows that the total merging firms have
relatively large decreases in total slack (-99.3%) while the
nonmerging firms show a total increase (+14.6%). Similarly,
each subcategory of slack shows greater reductions for the
merged firms. The widest difference occurs in the change in
potential slack where the merged firms show a decrease in
CHGPOT of 25.6% while the nonmerging fiirms show an increase
of 47.1%. In each instance, the relative difference in
slack supports the first hypothesis that a greater reduction
in slack occurs as a result of merger.
The second hypothesis, which states that horizontal
mergers should exhibit the greatest slack reduction among
the merged firms, is also supported by the results in Table
4. Horizontal mergers show the largest reduction in total
slack (-134%), followed by vertical mergers (-81.9%) and
finally conglomerates (-32.1%). The three summary
indicators show similar results. With the exception of
CHGREC between the horizontal and vertical mergers, each
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CHGPOT - 42.1 135
CHGTOT -134 163
Vertical:
CHGAV - 35.2 164
CHGREC - 10.2 64
CHGPOT - 27.5 129



























69.9 142 -531 246
4.9 84.8 -132 239
25.6 14.7 -267 500
99.3 184 - 60.8 422
40.4 127 -341 265
17.5 49.1 - 54.8 200
47.1 138 -220 363
14.6 186 -361 630
subcategory shows the greatest decrease in slack for
horizontal mergers. Vertical mergers show decreases for all
three subcategories, although these are less pronounced than
for the horizontal mergers. Conglomerates show a decrease
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only in CHGAV (-27.2%), with slight increases in both CHGREC
(+19.2%) and CHGPOT (+28.9%).
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
GROUP MEANS
The findings presented in Table 4 are suggestive but not
conclusive. While differences in slack were found to be
consistent with the hypotheses, those differences are not
necessarily significant. To examine the issue further, t-
tests for significant differences in change in slack between
the subgroups were conducted. An alpha level of .10 was
used as a cutoff for significance. Table 5 reports the T
values and significance levels for tests of difference
between merging and nonmerging firms (column 1) as well as
between other subgroups of sample firms (columns 2-7)
.
Several results are apparent from Table 5. The overall
total slack reduction is significantly greater for the
merging firms than for the nonmergers (CHGTOT = -2.61).
This is apparently driven by CHGPOT (T = -2.37) in that
neither CHGAV nor CHGREC are significant at an alpha level
of .10. The major contrast among merger types and
nonmergers is between horizontal mergers and nonmergers
(column 2). Here CHGAV (T = -1.81), CHGPOT (T = -2.43), and
CHGTOT (T = -3.02) all show significant differences.
Although there is some indication of a difference between
vertical mergers and nonmergers (column 3), this is
dominated by CHGPOT (T = -2.03) and the difference between
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total change in slack for vertical mergers and nonmergers is
not as pronounced as between horizontal mergers and
nonmergers. Columns 5 through 7 compare merger types; no
indication of significant differences is apparent on the
basis of type. The largest difference for CHGTOT occurs
between horizontal and conglomerate mergers (T = -1.33) but
this is still outside the .10 level of significance.
D. TESTS OF INDUSTRY AND SIZE EFFECTS
While no formal hypotheses were stated to expect slack
change to differ depending on industry or firm size, an
exploratory analysis to address industry and size effects
was conducted. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
test for the statistical significance of any differences in
the variability of the slack measures on the basis of
industry group and firm size. Table 6 lists the results.
The merging and nonmerging firms were tested separately.
The three subcategories of slack (CHGAV, CHGREC, and CHGPOT)
and change in total slack (CHGTOT) served as the dependent
variables. The null hypothesis tested by ANOVA is that the
means of the dependent variables of the populations from
which the sample firms were drawn are all equal. Rejecting
this hypothesis would indicate that a significant difference
in means exists between the sample groups.
For computed values of F less than or equal to 1.0, one
could immediately conclude that the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected, even without reference to statistical tables or
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specific alpha levels. The expected value of any skewed F
distribution is very near 1.0 and any value less than 1.0 is
not significant. As with the t-statistic, alpha is again
chosen as 0.10. With the exception of the dependent
variable CHGPOT (F = 2.29) when comparing industry means
within the nonmerging category, none of the F values are
large enough to suggest that there are significant
differences in the slack measures on the basis of industry
or firm size. The low F values in nearly every instance
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reinforce the t-statistic results which looked only at the
type of merger and similarly showed no significant
differences between the means of the horizontal, vertical,
and conglomerate categories.
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The mean changes in slack values shown in Table 4
generally support the hypothesis that organizational slack
decreases as a result of merger activity. Comparing the
total merging sample with the total nonmergers, the merging
group shows smaller means for each of the four measures with
a total slack reduction of nearly 100%. The largest
difference occurs in CHGPOT where the merging firms show a
25.6% decrease while the nonmerging firms show a 47.1%
increase.
The mean values classified by type of merger support the
hypothesis that horizontal mergers should exhibit the
greatest slack reduction, followed by vertical mergers, and
to a lesser degree, conglomerates. While each type of
merger shows reductions in total slack, horizontal mergers
show the greatest reductions for each measure. The
conglomerate mergers have smaller decreases for each of the
four measures.
The t-statistics listed in Table 5 show varying levels
of significance between the mean values discussed above.
The most significant difference occurs with CHGTOT between
merging and nonmerging firms. However, none of the t-
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statistics for comparisons of merger type were significant.
While one could argue that the rank order of the results
support the hypothesis that slack change is determined by
type of merger, the t-statistics do not suggest large enough
differences in means to compensate for the large standard
deviations of the individual measures.
1. Effect of Merger Types
The larger overall decrease in slack for the merged
firms may be explained in terms of the efficiencies of the
acquiring firms. Mergers should expect a reduction in slack
because the acquiring firm was successful in building up
slack reserves through efficient manufacturing operations
and effective management prior to the merger. The excess
slack reserves were then absorbed in consolidating
operations as a result of the merger. The act of combining
research and development, marketing, management,
distribution, and production resulted in an abrupt reduction
in slack levels.
Further differences in slack change on the basis of
merger type might be explained using the transaction cost
approach suggested by Williamson (1975) . He argues that in
many instances the possibility of reducing transaction costs
drives organizations to restructure their operations. The
effect of reduced transaction costs is most pronounced for
vertical and conglomerate mergers where the target firm is
typically a buyer, seller, or transporter of the acquiring
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firm's products. The decreased transaction costs that
result from both of these types of acquisitions serve to
offset the slack reductions that occurred through the
consolidation. Because of the reduced transaction costs,
more resources become available to the merged firms and a
smaller net decrease in slack is realized.
2. Effect of Industry Group and Firm Size
No significant difference was found in any of the
slack measures on the basis of industry group or firm size.
Odell (1972) suggested that different levels of slack are
considered optimal depending on the industry, and these
levels may vary from one group to another depending on
economic and environmental factors unique to that industry.
The percent change model used in this study would conceal
any absolute slack distinctions between industries and in
fact no differences are found.
Similarly, change in slack is not shown to be a
function of firm size for this sample. Dimick and Murray
(1978) and Wolf (1971) suggested that slack levels should
vary proportionately with firm size, with larger firms
realizing the most slack due to increased economies of
scale. However, this does not necessarily imply a
difference in percent change as measured here. Although
absolute slack levels may well differ, they would not emerge
through the Bourgeois and Singh model. In addition, the
firms considered in this study are all "large" within their
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respective industries, ranking among the top 25% in terms of
net sales. Therefore, one would not expect to find a
substantial difference in slack on the basis of the
arbitrary size classifications and the model used here.
F. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The primary research question addressed in this thesis
is whether or not organizational slack is reduced as a
result of mergers. It was suggested that the consolidating
effects of mergers would bring about a more efficient
utilization of excess resources in the parties to the
merger, thus leading to greater overall efficiencies and
reduced slack. This study supports the hypothesis that
mergers result in greater slack reductions than would
otherwise occur. The results also support the hypothesis
that horizontal mergers demonstrate the greatest decrease in
slack. Vertical and conglomerate mergers also show
reductions although to a lesser degree. However, only the
mean differences between the total slack levels of the
merging versus nonmerging firms and between the horizontal
mergers versus nonmerging firms are statistically
significant.
A possible explanation for the weak statistical results
is that a distinct and generalizable relationship between
mergers and organizational slack does not exist. Chapter II
discussed several motives for merger including increased
economies of scale; synergistic effects of combined
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production, marketing, R&D, and distribution; faster growth;
and risk reduction. The underlying factor behind all of
these motives is the effect on profitability, and post-
acquisition improvement in this area has not been verified.
Studies looking at profitability, performance, and long-term
survival potential as a result of merger activity show
either no significant difference or conflicting results in
comparing merging and nonmerging firms. As rather
succinctly summarized in a 1969 FTC report on mergers and
acquisitions, there may be just too many players
(management, stockholders, the public, competitors,
government) and too many internal and external factors
(synergies, characteristics of acquired and acquiring firms,
takeover artists, industry constraints) to allow for any
inference regarding merger effects or contributions. In
light of these previous studies, the failure to discover a
more definitive relationship between slack and mergers is
not surprising.
G. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
These results must be interpreted in view of some
inherent limitations of the study. First, the study relied
on a multidimensional model of slack as the basis for the
empirical analysis. The purpose of relying entirely on the
Bourgeois and Singh model (1983) was to obtain quantitative
measures of slack suitable for statistical analysis. The
financial data used to calculate the individual slack
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measures were readily available in the financial statements
of the sample firms.
However, there are several shortcomings to this model
that deserve consideration. Although the model is objective
and straightforward, it provides a somewhat limited measure
of slack. The primary dimension distinguishing the three
categories of slack is the "ease of recovery," or the
relative ease with which excess resources can be put to work
by the firm. Although the eight individual measures cover a
fairly wide range of operational indicators, issues such as
managerial motivations and sentiments, economic or business
constraints, and underlying strategic concerns are
neglected. An additional qualitative measure of slack may
be required to determine absolute slack levels in terms of
organizational preferences. Surveys such as those used by
Odell (1972) could elicit responses from executives
regarding their perceptions of firm performance and
utilization of slack resources. Thus, a "perceptual
measure" could be obtained and used in conjunction with the
financial measure.
Moses (1987) raises an objective to the model on the
basis of the three-dimensional categorization. Although he
considered the model conceptually appealing, Moses found
that the three categories may not be distinct on the basis
of ease of recovery. Instead, he recommends four dimensions
as follows: 1) slack generated from increases in profits.
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2) slack tied up as excess working capital, 3) slack
absorbed as excess operating expenses, and 4) slack tied up
in excess capital assets. Whatever subdivisions are
considered, the overriding fact is that Bourgeois' model has
yet to be empirically tested. Although Singh (1983) used
this model as a basis for his study, he deviated from the
original design by proposing a two-component model distin-
guishing between absorbed and unabsorbed slack. To date,
the validity of the Bourgeois-Singh model as an accurate
indicator of slack has not been confirmed.
A second limitation concerns sample selection. Analysis
of merger effects required that the merging firms not engage
in merger activity for several years prior to the 1977-1978
period. Although some 2,485 mergers occurred during that
two-year time frame, the majority of them had to be excluded
from the sample because of this stipulation. In addition,
the arbitrary requirement that the acquired firm size be at
least 10% of that of the acquiring firm eliminated another
group from consideration. Both of these served to preclude
a large pool of successful mergers where the acquiring firms
typically practiced ongoing acquisition behavior. The time
series analysis placed a similar constraint on the group of
nonmerging control firms. The firms chosen as controls
could not engage in any merger activity over the entire
decade from 1973 to 1982; finding a sufficient number of
firms within each industry group that were comparable in
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size to the merging firms and at the same time fit this
criterion, was a sizable task.
A third limitation concerns the classification of
mergers by type. This study looked only at a general
categorization based on horizontal, vertical, or
conglomerate industry expansion. Marren (1985), Mueller
(1980), and Steiner (1975) suggest that the acquisition
methods; management and stockholder motives; and the
takeover strategy, whether hostile, tender offer, friendly,
or white knight; all can influence merger effects. Each
author addresses studies which look at post-merger
profitability and overall performance in light of these
distinctions. However, more often than not, findings are
not significantly different regardless of the sub-categories
maintained.
A final limitation concerns the financial measures used
to reflect slack. The measurement tools used to study
profitability effects through merger in previous studies are
similar to the slack components used in this thesis.
Geroski (1984) relied exclusively on stock prices (similar
to P/E ratio) to measure performance. Lev and Mandelker
(1972) used long-term debt and various measures of liquidity
(similar to L-T Debt/Net Worth, accounts receivable,
inventory, and G&A) to measure profitability in acquiring
firms. Mueller (1986) refers to several studies of merger
profitability which use return on shareholders equity.
85
dividends, and net sales as indicators. In each case above,
the merging firms did not perform any better than the
average performance of their base industries. Mueller
refers to one study by Hagarty (1970) in which firms
experienced relative declines in efficiency and slowdowns in
sales and profitability following their acquisitions.
Further examples are widespread throughout the literature
(Steiner, 1975; Geroski, 1984; Marren, 1985). Given that
the measures for slack used in this study are similar to
measures used to reflect profitability in previous studies,
some confounding of profitability and slack effects may have
occurred.
H . SUMMARY
This chapter presented the statistical methods used to
analyze the data. In general, the calculated slack values
cover a wide range but seem to indicate a relationship with
merger activity. The total merging category showed a
significant reduction in slack over the nonmerging control
group. Firms were distinguished on the basis of size, type
of merger, and industry category. The most significant
reduction in slack levels occurred for horizontal mergers,
although both vertical and conglomerate mergers showed
reductions. The merging firms demonstrated larger slack
reductions in each industry group than their nonmerging
counterparts. Firm size did not show significant
differences in slack.
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Possible explanations for the inconclusive results were
offered. The first concerned the limitations of the slack
model itself and the lack of its verification as a valid
measure of organizational slack. Second, the constraints
imposed by the sample selection were discussed. The
analysis required that the majority of mergers and control
firms be excluded from the sample either because of multiple
mergers or firm size. Finally, it was suggested that no
generalizable causal relationship between mergers and slack
exists. Previous studies have found little support for
post-merger profitability or performance and this slack




This chapter summarizes the study and presents the
conclusions that can be drawn from the results. The chapter
begins with a brief review of the theory of organizational
slack and its hypothesized relationship with corporate
mergers. Next, a summary of the findings are listed along
with the ensuing conclusions. Finally, some areas for
future research are discussed.
B. REVIEW OF THE THEORY
This study began with a brief history of U.S. corporate
merger activity. The evolution of growth via merger was
presented along with the trends and cycles that responded to
major economic influences such as the Great Depression and
World War II. Despite various setbacks, e.g., government
legislation and public discord, the number of mergers has
continually increased.
The reasons for engaging in corporate mergers are
diverse and subject to various interpretations, depending on
the parties who are either directly or indirectly affected.
The advantages of growth through merger include economies of
scale due to more efficient joint production, integrated
facilities, research and development savings, and lower
financing costs. Other reasons for merging are the tax
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incentives, the reduced operating risk as a result of the
portfolio effect, increased stock valuation, improved market
potential, and more effective management.
Whether or not these motives justify the effects on
society is continually under debate. Merger proponents
argue that the resources saved through more efficient
operations, increased research and development expenditures,
and better employee conditions outweigh any disadvantages.
Opponents claim that mergers serve only to restrict
competition, lead to reciprocity, increase the economic
power of a handful of corporate giants, and fulfill the
aspirations and desires of power-hungry executives.
Organizational slack is one concept that is suggested as
a means to investigate merger effects. Although several
theories of slack have been proposed, theorists generally
agree that slack constitutes a cushion of resources which
enables an organization to adapt to internal or external
pressures for change as well as to initiate changes in
strategy. Slack consists of those material, managerial, and
capital resources that are not currently being used to
achieve organizational goals. Allowing a specified level of
slack serves as a stabilizing mechanism for the firm to
either absorb excess resources in times of prosperity or to
provide emergency reserves during bad times.
A certain amount of slack is therefore beneficial to an
organization, although the optimal amount typically varies
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from industry to industry depending on numerous
environmental factors as well as internal risk and
production factors. Teece (1982) suggests an explicit
relationship between slack and mergers. He claims that
growth via merger may be efficiency-driven as a means to
better utilize slack resources. Further, mergers and
acguisitions are expected to minimize the slack in the
parties to the merger by channeling the excess resources of
the acquiring firm into more productive use while also
providing more control over the acquired firm.
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate whether
mergers do in fact affect the levels of organizational slack
in the firms involved. It was hypothesized that the post-
merger firm should demonstrate reduced levels of
organizational slack because of the efficiencies and
synergies that occur in the resultant operation. It was
also hypothesized that the type of merger would affect the
amount of slack in the resultant firm, with horizontal
mergers eliciting the greatest slack reduction, followed by
vertical mergers, and finally conglomerates. To test these
hypotheses, the Bourgeois and Singh (1982) model of slack
was used. This model measures three dimensions of slack
based on ease of recoverability and combines them into one
value to indicate the relative change in slack levels from
one year to the next.
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C. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of this thesis generally support the
original hypotheses. First, the sample of merged firms
demonstrated greater slack reductions than the nonmerging
sample. Comparing the mergers that occurred in 1977 and
1978 with a nonmerging control group over the same period
showed consistently larger reductions in total slack for the
merged firms as well as reductions in the subcategories of
available, recoverable, and potential slack. The t-test
comparing merging and nonmerging firms showed a .01 level of
significance for change in total slack. One explanation for
these findings is the fact that mergers lead to more
efficient utilization of excess resources and greater
efficiencies in the merged firms.
Second, the study supports the hypothesis that the type
of merger influences the amount of slack reduction.
Horizontal mergers showed greater decreases in slack for
each measure except for recoverable slack, with the largest
reduction in total slack. Although vertical mergers
resulted in reduced slack for each category, the total
decrease was less than for horizontal mergers.
Conglomerates showed the least reduction in slack for the
merger types, with increases in both the recoverable and
potential categories. The opportunities for using slack
resources (i.e., complementary resources/need situations)
are a "motivation" for horizontal mergers. Vertical and
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conglomerate mergers driven by the desire to reduce
transaction costs do not provide as great an opportunity to
reduce slack.
Finally, the samples were categorized by industry type
and pre-merger firm size to investigate whether slack was
affected by these variables. Significant differences were
not found in either case. Although differences in absolute
slack levels between industry groups may exist, these would
not be uncovered by the change measure used in this study.
The inability to find differences in change in slack on the
basis of firm size may be attributed to the arbitrary size
classifications used here. The firms that constitute the
study sample are all among the top 2 5% of U.S. firms;
therefore, a subcategorization of these would not be
expected to show significant differences.
The empirical results of this investigation were
explained in terms of the increased efficiency of the merged
firms. Slack reduction was assumed to be a positive benefit
of more proficient, consolidated operations and maximized
resource utilization. Merger advocates would use these
outcomes to help support the argument that mergers and
acquisitions are in fact advantageous forms of growth not
only to the firms involved but also to the economy and
society in general. However, merger opponents could counter
that the slack was actually reduced below optimal levels to
dangerously low points at which reserves are not readily
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available to the firm if needed. A certain amount of slack
is deemed necessary as a buffering mechanism which allows
the organization to respond to fluctuations in demand,
alternative marketing and production procedures, and
increased research and development efforts. If slack is
reduced to the point below which the merged firm can
effectively adapt to business contingencies, then the firm's
ability to survive may well be threatened. Operations may
be unduly restricted, eliminating the flexibility required
to compete adequately in the marketplace. Therefore,
results which show reductions in slack levels could have
negative implications. These reductions may actually
jeopardize the solvency of the parties to the merger and
expose them to undue risk and unnecessarily constrained
operations. Thus, the issue of whether reduced slack levels
are advantageous or speculative needs to be addressed
further. This is one possible area for future research that
is discussed next.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study elicits several other approaches to
investigating merger effects. First, similar research could
be conducted using additional measures of absolute slack.
These could be devised along the lines of the Singh (1983)
procedure which used financial measures to differentiate
between absorbed and unabsorbed slack, or by the use of
surveys as done by Gershenberg (1986) and Odell (1972).
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Absolute slack measures would allow for the determination of
normal industry levels of slack on the basis of industry-
wide means or an average of the most successful firms within
the industry. Post-merger slack could then be compared with
industry norms and the results analyzed in terms of
deviations from the norms.
Second, it may be necessary to look at other categoriza-
tions of mergers. One limitation discussed in Chapter V
concerned the breakdown of mergers into horizontal,
vertical, and conglomerate. As suggested, a distinction
based on acquisition motives or takeover strategy may be
more appropriate for determining possible effects on slack.
A study looking at such alternative classifications would
entail a more thorough investigation of each individual
merger to determine underlying motives or strategies that
are not always easily identified.
Third, one may wish to look at post-merger performance
over a longer time frame. Weston (198 0) and Lev and
Mandelker (1972) suggest that merger effects are not fully
realized until five or more years after the merger. This
study only looked at two and four years after the merger and
may have omitted significant effects that showed up after
this time frame. Such a lengthened study period creates a
further difficulty in that firms who engaged in other
mergers after the four year period would have to be
eliminated from the sample.
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Finally, a more comprehensive sample consisting of firms
from all major industry groups may provide more definitive
results. This thesis only looked at six industries.
Although they were among the most active in terms of
mergers, other industries were neglected. For example, the
financial measures used to determine slack were not
appropriate for the banking industry. Hence, this group was
not included in the sample, even though it contained a






CHANGE IN SLACK—MERGING FIRMS
Slack Measure
Firm CHGAV CHGREC CHGPOT CHGTOT
Alberto-Culver - 99.8 238.6 2.68 141.4
Carlisle Corp. - 71.3 - 29.1 - 16.8 -117
Crutcher Resources 84.2 -130.1 - 63.9 -109.7
Daniel Industries - 52.9 9.09 -138.2 -181.9
Dexter Corp. -127.8 - 11.0 - 33.9 -172.8
Duplex Products -156.1 10.9 169.7 24.5
Ex-Cell-0 Corp. - 76.5 - 40.9 - 39.1 -156.4
Esterline Corp. - 38.1 9.45 5.22 - 23.5
Guardsman Chem. - 79.1 - 50.4 - 23.2 -152.7
Health-Chem Corp. 44.2 59.4
Jack Eckerd Corp. - 40.3 - 26.5 - 12.6 - 79.5
Kellwood Co. 29.5 62.1 -119.0 - 27.3
Allis-Chalmers - 55.3 - 5.0 - 39.2 - 99.5
Ames Dept. Stores - 39.2 - 0.8 56.9 16.9
Asamera Oil -391.1 - 2.34 -214.6 -607.9
Bowmar Instrument -112.2 500.0
Cabot Corp. -143.1 -131.8 - 31.7 -306.5
Carter-Hawley Hale - 21.3 - 35.9 - 15.1 - 72.4
Canadian Marconi -103.7 - 58.2 53.2 -108.8
Chock Full'O Nuts 52.44 -113.9 142.5 81.0
Cubic Corp. 0.01 - 55.1 - 16.48 - 71.56
Dayco Corp. 45.7 13.6 45.2 104.4
Dayton-Hudson Corp. - 52.7 - 6.1 - 22.3 - 81.1
Essex Chemical -104.9 83.9 -253.5 -274.5
Federal Co. 31.4 27.1 24.1 82.7
Louis. Land & Explo -133.2 149.0 - 49.2 - 33.4
Mark Controls -322.3 111.5 - 13.5 -224.3
Nexus Industries - 78.9 - 56.7 -254.8 -390.4
Great Lakes Chem. -315.9 72.4 40.9 -202.6
Gulton Industries -236.2 - 3.2 225.7 - 13.7
Harvey Hubbell - 38.2 - 32.5 65.6 - 5.1
Heck's -154.1 - 29.9 -181.9 -365.9
Johnson Controls - 62.8 - 63.89 - 38.7 -165.4
Molson Companies 43.5 - 18.6 - 15.8 9.1
Pitney Bowes - 36.9 - 26.8 - 6.9 - 70.7
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TABLE 7 (CONTINUED)
Firm CHGAV CHGREC CHGPOT CHGTOT
Tracer Inc. 174.4 23.2 224.6 422.2
United Foods 9.8 8.5 -206.2 -198.7
Valmac Industries 35.8 -109.2 -241.3 -314.7
Viacom Int •
1
12.2 34.3 66.8 45.2
Witco Chemical - 0.7 - 16.1 60.4 43.7
Address-Multigraph -101.8 153.6 0.89 14.4
Heath Tecna 245.6 30.5 -235.9 40.2
Rite Aid Corp. -205.7 - 11.6 - 1.8 -218.9
Sabine Corp. - 63.4 - 0.5 -210.8 -118.5
House of Vision 61.1 - 20.8
Belscot Retailers 126.2 213.1 -193.8 145.5
Chessco Industries 1.66 52.1 -266.7 -218.9
Handschy Chemical - 30.9 9.34 -219.8 -244.4
King's Dept. Store -531.2 221.4 -126.6 -436.4
Rolm Corp. 0.88 - 96.0 135.1 15.8
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TABLE 8
CHANGE IN SLACK—NONMERGING FIRMS
Slack Measure
Firm CHGAV CHGREC CHGPOT CHGTOT
Family Dollar -169.9 18.9 70.5 - 11.5
Carson Pirie Scott - 33.6 - 1.2 3.4 - 31.3
Assoc. Dry Goods - 14.6 - 34.5 - 76.7 -125.7
Allied Stores Corp. - 30.7 - 0.9 11.9 - 19.7
Mercantile Stores 10.1 - 9.9 -150.2 -150.1
J.C. Penney 0.2 125.6 -110.8 15.5
Zayre -313.5 18.9 - 66.1 -360.7
C.G. Murphy - 30.9 - 35.3 51.6 - 14.6
Long ' s Drug -138.4
Jamesway Corp. 40.3 - 16.9 49.9 73.3
Winkelman Stores 55.2 8.3 - 84.2 - 20.7
Wiebold - 32.9 40.2 294.9 302.3
Allen Group - 51.4 - 17.9 44.3 - 25.0
Badger Meter 42.9 0.1 - 0.4 42.7
Clark Equipment 39.7 - 10.6 281.8 310.9
Instron Corp. - 30.9 9.34 -219.8 -241.1
Burndy Corp. 54.9 - 16.6 55.7 94.1
Clarostat Mfg. - 6.09 - 54.8 141.9 80.8
Laberge Inc. - 14.6 49.4 136.6 171.4
Thomas & Betts 33.7 11.7 - 72.1 - 26.7
Int'l Controls Corp. - 9.3 248.5
Harnischfeger Corp. - 91.8 18.3 335.8 262.3
AMP Inc. 40.6 - 24.0 - 16.7 0.1
Big Three Ind. -252.6 2.95 40.3 -209.4
Digicon 10.8 200.4 - 51.2 161.1
Connelly Container 0.1
Int'l Flavors 207.1 - 19.8 11.8 215.1
ITT Rayonier 14.2 22.5 88.3 124.9
First Miss. Corp. - 58.8 - 18.0 216.4 139.6
Greif Brothers 264.9 2.18 362.6 629.7
Amerada Hess - 36.8 16.9 - 16.4 - 36.3
G.A. Hormel - 44.1 79.3 -101.8 - 66.6
Big V Supermarkets -245.5 59.7 92.4 - 93.3
Forest Oil -341.0 - 17.6 179.5 -179.1
Westvaco Corp. - 12.5 20.3 26.4 34.2
Shopwell, Inc. 5.81 - 0.9 -191.8 -186.7
Loctite Corp. -231.4 29.3 47.9 -154.3
Tasty Baking Co. - 4.6 24.9 - 21.9 - 1.5
Pueblo Int'l Inc. 105.5 57.4 - 45.4 117.4
NVF Co. 147.0 100.0
Products Research -112.1 44.7 160.9 93.5
Pacific Resources - 87.2 - 4.6 - 48.8 -140.6
N.A. Royalties 0.6 19.8 117.3 137.7
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